In Katherine Rosenberg-Wohl v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 16 Cal.5th 520 (July 18, 2024), the California Supreme Court reversed the California Court of Appeal’s decision in favor of State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”) barring a lawsuit based on California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) under Section 2071, finding that lawsuits against insurers must be filed within one year of the denial of the claim giving rise to such lawsuit. The Supreme Court found that the four-year statute of limitations applicable to the UCL applied, rather than Section 2071, applicable to fire insurance policies.  The Supreme Court reasoned that the UCL lawsuit did not pray for damages based on State Farm’s denial of policy benefits under a homeowner’s policy issued to plaintiff, Katherine Rosenberg-Wohl (the “plaintiff”). Rather, it prayed for non-monetary injunctive relief intended to prevent State Farm from engaging in unfair practices related to the adjustment of property claims. Hence, the plaintiff’s claim was not based “on the policy” as it did not seek to recover policy benefits.

In Truck Ins. Exch. v. Kaiser Cement and Gypsum Corp. et al., 16 Cal.5th 520 ( June 17, 2024), the California Supreme Court reversed a California Second District Court of Appeal decision addressing vertical and horizontal exhaustion and found that first layer excess insurance policies are triggered upon vertical exhaustion of primary policies directly below the excess policies.  Hence, excess carriers can no longer take the position that defense and indemnity coverage is not triggered under their policies for continuous loss, so long as there is primary coverage afforded to the insured, even if such coverage is for a different policy period. The Supreme Court adopted the reasoning in SantaFe Braun, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of North America (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 19 (the SantaFe decision).

In California Specialty Insulation, Inc. v. Allied World Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 102 Cal.App.5th 1 (May 17, 2024), the California Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of California Specialty Insulation, Inc. (“CSI”) against Allied World Surplus Insurance Company (“Allied World”) in connection with a dispute over whether coverage was afforded under an Allied World liability policy for an underlying lawsuit involving a construction jobsite accident. Allied World denied coverage of CSI in connection with the lawsuit based on a “Contractor” exclusion endorsement in its policy.

On August 10, 2005, President George W. Bush signed into law the “Safe, Accountable, Flexible and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2005,” which amended Sub-Chapter 1 of Chapter 301 of Title 49, United States Code, colloquially referred to as the “Graves Amendment.” The Graves Amendment abolishes the imposition of any form of vicarious liability on car and truck rental and leasing companies in the United States on actions based solely on their renter’s negligence. As Congressman Graves, the sponsor of the measure, explained: “What we are doing is eliminating vicarious liability simply because the [car rental agencies] own the vehicle.” 151 Cong. Rec. H1199, H1200-01, 134 (daily ed. March 9, 2005)(statement of Rep. Graves). Thus, the Graves Amendment specifically prohibits vicarious liability-based causes of action against entities that are in the trade or business of renting or leasing vehicles.  

As we enter the fall season, we can expect to see more snow, more holiday traffic, and more pumpkin spice items on the shelves. We also see school buses back on the roads as students are settling into their new school year. Each day, 26 million children take 480,000 school buses to school across the United States. School buses, although considered by some to be a boring, routine part of everyday life in America, have a fun history.

The threat of nuclear verdicts in personal injury cases in Colorado became a reality in Denver District Court in May 2024 after a jury verdict of $18,809,431 was awarded to a plaintiff in a lawsuit stemming from a collision in which a driver employed by a logistics company was driving an F-150 and rear-ended a van transporting a disabled adult plaintiff. The plaintiff, a 47-year-old developmentally disabled man, was a passenger in a van driven by an employee of an adult day program service provider. The driver of the van slowed to avoid an object in the road and was rear-ended by the defendant driver in the F-150, who was in the scope and course of his employment.

In major accidents involving severe injuries or even death, claimant attorneys join freight brokers to the claim in an attempt to maximize the amount of insurance and assets that will be available to pay a judgment or settlement. By contrast, claimant attorneys with claims involving soft tissue injury or other minor damages often avoid the added challenges and costs of trying to establish liability against the freight broker, because the motor carrier has ample insurance to pay the likely judgment or settlement. This trend is understandable considering that motor carriers’ minimum insurance requirements under FMCSA regulations are as low as $750,000 for general freight or $1 million for low hazardous materials, and certain motor carriers’ requirements are even lower. In addition, freight brokers often require a motor carrier to have $1 million in liability insurance and to include the freight broker as an additional insured.

Texas is teetering on the edge of a final determination of whether the Admission Rule will apply in future cases in the state.  The Admission Rule, recognized in many states and at least five appellate districts in Texas, says that direct negligence claims such as negligent training, hiring, and supervision are merely legal routes other than respondeat superior to impute liability onto an employer when the employee acts outside the course and scope of their employment. Under the Admission Rule, when an employer admits that an employee was in the course and scope of employment at the time of an alleged incident, evidence of the employer’s hiring, training, or supervision practices becomes inadmissible as irrelevant and likely to prejudice the jury because vicarious liability has already been established.