Daily Blast December 11, 2014

In Powers v. W.B. Mobile Servs., Inc., Cause No. 90133-3, the issue was whether service of process on one defendant tolled the statute of limitations as to an unserved and unnamed defendant identified with a “John Doe” placeholder. There, Jesse Powers was injured when a handicap access ramp platform at a residential construction site collapsed when he used it. At the time, Powers was working for an awning company hired by Premier Communities, Inc. to install an awning on a modular building. Premier also contracted with Pacific Mobile Structures, Inc. to supply the ramp that collapsed. Unbeknownst to the parties, Pacific had subcontracted with W.B. Mobile to install the ramp. After falling, Powers unsuccessfully tried to find out who put the ramp together. He eventually sued Premier, Pacific, and two John Does. He identified Doe One as “the builder of the handicap access ramp where the incident occurred.” The statute of limitations for Powers’ suit expired on June 2, 2009. Pursuant to RCW 4.16.170 (wherein service of process on one defendant tolls the statute of limitations as to unserved defendants), he had 90 days to serve his complaint after filing suit. He timely served Pacific and Premier, but did not serve either of the Doe defendants or W.B. Mobile.

Over a year after filing the complaint, Powers obtained discovery identifying W.B. Mobile as the ramp installer. He moved to amend his complaint four months later by substituting W.B. Mobile for Doe One. The trial court granted W.B. Mobile’s motion to dismiss for failure to bring claims within the statute of limitations. The trial court also dismissed the claims against Premier and Pacific after they stipulated that they had reached a settlement with Powers. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding Power’s service of Pacific and Premier within 90 days of the filing of his complaint tolled the statute of limitations on his claims against W.B. Mobile. It remanded for a trial on the merits. The Court of Appeals did not consider whether Powers’ amended complaint related back to the date of his original complaint under CR 15(c). The Supreme Court granted review and affirmed.

According to the Supreme Court, Powers satisfied the first prong of the reasonable particularity standard enunciated inSidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc., 117 Wn.2d 325,329, 815 P.2d 781 (1991) by showing that he made a reasonable effort to identify an unnamed defendant and that actually naming that defendant was unreasonably difficult given the information available and that he timely served at least one named defendant. He thus tolled the statute of limitations as to W. B. Mobile when he served Pacific. He was thereafter entitled to amend his complaint under CR 10(a)(2) to substitute the actual name of the defendant in place of the placeholder for that defendant even after the statute of limitations expired without needing to show that the amendment related back to the date of his original pleading. W.B. Mobile received sufficient notice to ensure that it was not prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the merits, which satisfied the second prong of the reasonable particularity standard. The owner and sole employee of the company received a copy of the complaint and Pacific’s invoices reflecting it installed the ramp well within the 90 days required for service after Powers filed his complaint. W.B. Mobile received actual notice of Powers’ claim in a timely manner. The Court held that Powers identified Doe One with reasonable particularity and thus tolled the statute of limitations against W.B. Mobile by timely serving Pacific and substituting W.B. Mobile’s name for “Doe One . . builder of the handicap access ramp where the incident occurred.”