Roadmap Established in Federal Court For Winning a Summary Judgment Motion Premised on New York’s Threshold Statute
In a case that has significant ramifications for transportation litigation in New York, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff’s injuries, which included shoulder tears with arthroscopic surgery and lumbar spine herniations with injections following a rear-end collision accident, could not be considered “serious injuries” as defined by New York Insurance Law §5102(d) (the “threshold law”).

New York, N.Y. (May 2025) - In a case that has significant ramifications for transportation litigation in New York, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff’s injuries, which included shoulder tears with arthroscopic surgery and lumbar spine herniations with injections following a rear-end collision accident, could not be considered “serious injuries” as defined by New York Insurance Law §5102(d) (the “threshold law”).
The purpose of New York’s threshold law is to weed out frivolous third-party claims and limit recovery to significant injuries. New York Insurance Law §5012(d) lists categories which meet the statutory definition of a “serious injury”.
In most of transportation litigation in New York, the three most common categories that are at issue are whether the plaintiff suffered: (i) a “permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member”; (ii) a “significant limitation of use of a body function or system”; or (iii) a “medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person’s usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following . . . the injury.”
During the litigation, the defense hired a medical doctor to carefully review all the plaintiff’s medical records and to evaluate the plaintiff and his injuries and to come to a conclusion as to whether the plaintiff’s injuries were degenerative, pre-existing and not related to this accident. A biomechanical expert was also retained to dissect the kinematics of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries, how the plaintiff’s body would move inside the car he was in, and what conclusions can drawn based on how the accident occurred, the speed of the accident, and whether, from a biomechanical perspective, the plaintiff’s claimed injuries could or could not have been caused by the impact of the accident. The biomechanical expert concluded that, given the slow speed of the accident and the fact that the plaintiff was a belted passenger, there was no causation between the minor low- speed rear end accident that caused minimal damage to the plaintiff’s vehicle and the plaintiff’s alleged injuries and resulting surgery.
Regarding the plaintiff’s experts, the Second Circuit pointed to the fact that the plaintiff’s own doctors did not fully consider all the plaintiff’s medical records, and further pointed to the fact that the plaintiff’s medical doctors offered conclusory statements as to causality, merely stating that in their medical opinion, “within a reasonable degree of medical probability,” they believe the accident caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The Second Circuit found that these types of conclusory medical conclusions were not linked to, nor supported by, nor referenced to, any medical records from any of the plaintiff’s medical charts. The court further found that the defense orthopedic expert pointed to the MRIs and X-rays of the plaintiff, which showed degenerative conditions, and the defendants’ medical doctor’s conclusions were further bolstered by the findings of the defendants’ biomechanical expert’s conclusions, as well as the fact that the plaintiff never sought treatment or hospitalization immediately after the accident.
The Second Circuit also took issue with the conclusory statements of the plaintiff’s doctors, noting that their “bald assertions, unaccompanied by any rationale,” were insufficient “to create a genuine issue of fact” as to whether the plaintiff’s injuries were causally related to the accident.
In conclusion, the Second Circuit held that there was a lack of causation between the plaintiff’s alleged injuries and his accident, thereby affirming the District Court’s summary judgment dismissal decision in full.
This decision and order from the District Court, which has been affirmed by the Second Circuit, provides a roadmap for defense attorneys for winning a summary judgment motion premised on New York’s threshold statute. Importantly, this is applicable to litigation where plaintiffs have surgeries.
The plaintiff’s bar will rely on the fact that the plaintiff had a surgery following an accident to argue that the “serious injury” threshold was met. With the right questioning of a plaintiff at a deposition, and the retention of highly credentialed experts, threshold motions can be successful.