Daily Blast November 6, 2014

The Washington Supreme Court issued an opinion in Scanlan v. Townsend, Cause No. 89853-7, impacting the nature and scope of personal service in Washington in a case of first impression. Teresa Scanlan and Karlin Townsend were involved in a car accident in October 2008. Scanlan filed a personal injury action against Townsend in October 2011. Scanlan apparently had difficulty locating Townsend and asked a legal process server to attempt to locate Townsend. The process server conducted a records search and identified two addresses for Townsend – one in Puyallup, WA and one in Vancouver, WA. The process server attempted to serve Townsend at the Puyallup address, but was told by a resident that Townsend did not live there. Two weeks later, the process server tried to serve Townsend at the Vancouver address. The process server left copies of the summons and the complaint with Townsend’s father. Townsend’s father later handed the summons and the complaint directly to her.

Townsend moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of service, arguing that she did not live at the Puyallup address and that she had not lived at the Vancouver address for years (the Vancouver address was her parent’s residence). She also argued that her father’s “accidental” service was not valid personal service. Scanlan responded, arguing she had established effective service on Townsend through substitute service of process because the process server left a copy of the summons and complaint at Townsend’s usual abode with Townsend’s father, a person of suitable age and discretion, who also resided at the house. Scanlan also argued Townsend’s father served Townsend personally by giving the summons and complaint to her when she visited him at his Vancouver home in late 2011 or early 2012. The trial court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals, Division I, reversed and remanded in a published opinion. The intermediate appellate court held that Scanlan established effective personal service of process because Townsend’s father was competent to effect service and he personally delivered copies of the summons and the complaint to Townsend within the statute of limitations.

The Washington Supreme Court granted review and affirmed. Critically, the Court characterized the issue as one of personal service rather than substitute service and thus confronted an issue of first impression - whether direct, hand-to-hand, but “secondhand,” service satisfied Washington’s service of process requirements. RCW 4.28.080(15) (personal service); RCW 4.28.080(16) (substitute service). The Court ultimately concluded Scanlan had established effective personal service of process on Townsend because Townsend’s father was competent to serve her. CR 4(c). He delivered copies of the summons and complaint personally to Townsend within the statute of limitations. That was sufficient for personal service under both RCW 4.28.080(15) and the court rule. Substitute service was therefore not at issue. The Court soundly rejected Townsend’s “accidental” service argument, noting no authority requires a process server’s consent or concurrent residence with the defendant.

The Court’s decision was unanimous and authored by Justice Sheryl Gordon McCloud.