Sixth Circuit Finds Negligent Hiring Claim Against Freight Broker Not Preempted by FAAAA

Pittsburgh, Pa. (July 15, 2025) - In a disappointing ruling on July 8, 2025, the Sixth Circuit in Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc. (24-3599) determined that the plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim against Total Quality Logistics, Inc., and Total Quality Logistics, LLC, (collectively “TQL”) was not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (“FAAAA”) found in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). According to the Court, plaintiff’s claim fell within the ambit of the “safety exception” found in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).

Section 14501(c)(2)(A) exempts from preemption “the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). To determine whether the exception applies, a court must address two issues: (1) whether common law tort claims like negligent hiring are part of a state’s “safety regulatory authority,” and (2) whether said claim is “with respect to motor vehicles. Id. The Cox court noted the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a state’s “regulatory authority” encompasses “common-law duties and standards of care.” Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 637 (2012); accord Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324 (2008) (holding that “[a]bsent other indication, reference to a State’s ‘requirements’ [in an express preemption statute] includes its common-law duties.”). Common law duties are often a powerful tool of governmental regulation and by creating a standard of care and imposing the “obligation to pay compensation” in the form of monetary damages when that standard is violated, states retain “a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.” Kurns, 565 U.S. at 637 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)).

In Cox, TQL arranged for motor carrier Golden Transit, Inc., to transport a load of goods. On May 8, 2019, Ms. Cox was driving with a passenger when her vehicle was struck from behind by a semi-truck. Ms. Cox died in the collision and her passenger incurred physical injuries. The semi-truck was operated by Golden Transit driver Amarjit Singh Khaira, who was transporting goods arranged by TQL. TQL moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s suit, arguing the claims were preempted by the FAAAA and not saved by the “safety exception.” Notably, the lower court agreed with TQL and dismissed plaintiff’s action.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit disagreed, reversed the lower court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. More specifically, despite finding that plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim fell squarely within the scope of 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1); the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the lower court and found that the “safety exception” applied, which allowed plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim to proceed.

In addressing the two-part safety exception test, the Sixth Circuit determined that an action satisfies the first prong of the “safety exception” if it is genuinely responsive to safety concerns. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s action is responsive to a safety concern, as plaintiff alleges that TQL hired an allegedly dangerous motor carrier which resulted in the death of Ms. Cox. However, the Sixth Circuit took matters a step further and stated that the plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim enforces “a standard of care on brokers which in turn, requires brokers to do their due diligence [to ensure] that they are hiring safe motor carriers.”

In addressing the second prong, “with respect to motor vehicles,” the Sixth Circuit declined to definitively rule as to whether a direct link between brokers and motor vehicles is required for the “safety exception” to apply. Specifically, the court stated “[t]here is good reason to doubt that the safety rule requires a direct connection to motor vehicles.” Notably, there is no precedent to support this position, and the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that its stance differed from other federal courts. “We respectfully diverge from the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits…[who suggest that] the regulated entity must be one which directly owns or operates motor vehicles.” The Court reasoned that “brokers are ultimately responsible for placing such motor vehicles on the road, even if those motor vehicles are driven and owned by a different entity.”

This rationale is flawed in that it fails to consider the basic concepts of control. As a result, the Sixth Circuit is essentially holding brokers liable for the acts of motor carriers outside its control. For example, if a carrier has federal authority to drive on U.S. highways, brokers are well within bounds to broker with said motor carriers to haul loads. The Sixth Circuit’s refusal to quantify a direct connection not only undermines the plain language of the statute and holds brokers essentially liable for the vetting, hiring, and training of motor carrier drivers, for which it has no control whatsoever, but it also ignored critical statutory language identifying that brokers are defined as “other than motor carrier or agent of a motor carrier.” § 13102 (14). In other words, brokers and motor carriers are not the same and should not be treated as such.

For more information about this decision, contact the authors of this alert. Visit our Transportation Practice page to learn more about our capabitilies in this area.

Authors:

Todd A. Gray, Managing Partner - Pittsburgh and Co-Chair of National Transportation Practice

Joelle Nelson, Partner and Co-Chair of National Transportation Practice

Jose Saplala, Associate